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Abstract 
According to Yamagishi (2011) trust can be viewed as a “booster rocket” that provides 
the necessary push for the take-off from the secure ground of committed relations. The 
aim of this paper is to formalize this idea. I look at a situation where networks of 
personalized exchange relationships provide assurance against untrustworthy 
behavior but reduce the opportunity to profit from trade in larger markets. With the 
help of a simple game theoretic model I show that mutual trust relations can emerge 
in anonymous markets, even when there is a clear danger of opportunism and the 
possibility of repeated interaction is ruled out.  
 
JEL classification: C72, D23, L22  
Keywords: Trust; networks; assurance; behavioral risk; incomplete 
contracts. 
 
 
 
 
* An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the FIBE-conference 2014, 
hosted by Norwegian School of Economics. I thank Gunnar Eskeland for helpful 
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1. Introduction 
As an extensive and fast growing literature has demonstrated, trust 
plays an important role in economic exchanges. Without trust markets 
would not function and thrive.1 
In impersonal market exchanges, trust is particular important 
when contracts are incomplete – as they are in most cases. Incomplete 
contracts arise when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information 
about the goods or services they trade and when individual behavior 
cannot be easily verified so as to ensure compliance. Incomplete 
contracts expose economic agents to behavioral risk, meaning that one 
or more parties in an economic transaction can be hurt by opportunistic 
behavior by others. In such an environment, trust is important. If people 
generally believe that others will behave trustworthy, mutual beneficial 
transactions can take place even when contracts are highly incomplete, 
or even missing.   
In settings in which trust matters most (incomplete contracts and 
clear behavioral risk) individuals may, however, be least likely to rely 
on trust. Instead, they will seek other types of control mechanisms. A 
common strategy to deal with behavioral risk is to restrict economic 
transactions to take place within networks or communities (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2004). Networks may function as an effective enforcement 
mechanism made possible by small-scale interaction. Within networks 
members meet regularly, they know each other well, they exchange 
information about each other and they may be willing to punish those 
who fail to keep promises. Because of these behavioral regularities, 
economic transactions within networks provide greater security against 
                                                          
1 See Gambetta (1988), Fukuyama (1996), Torsvik (2000), Kramer and Cook (2004), 
Hardin (2006), Fehr (2009) and Algan and Cahuc (2013), among many others. 
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opportunistic behavior compared to transactions in more anonymous 
markets. Hence, networks can be viewed as a solution to the problem of 
behavioral risk (Kollock, 1994; Aoki and Hayami 2001; Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002). 
Although networks help to solve problems related to behavioral 
risk they may generate problems in other areas. Due to its small size, 
networks restrict the opportunities to benefit from economies of scale, 
specialization and gains from trade. This produces a trade-off: Economic 
transactions within a network reduce the problems arising from 
incomplete contracts and behavioral risk, but they also restrict the 
agents’ ability to reap potential gains produced in larger markets. 
This type of reasoning forms the basis for the analysis of trust 
developed by the social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi. According to 
Yamagishi (2011), trust is important because it helps people to move out 
of established networks and to form relationships with new partners and 
new opportunities.2 His argument can be summarized as follows: When 
people face uncertainty in their transactions they tend to build 
commitment relationships (networks), which reduces uncertainty and 
gives them assurance against opportunistic behavior. But this strategy 
reduces the prospect of dealing with strangers outside the commitment 
relationship, which will give them higher returns if the strangers are 
trustworthy. Hence, the main function of trust is that it acts as a 
“booster” that makes it possible for people to move out of mutually 
committed relations and to invest their resources in more uncertain but 
at the same time more profitable projects. 
While Yamagishi’s idea about trust is widely cited within the 
general social science literature, it has received little attention in the 
                                                          
2 See also Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) for an earlier statement. 
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business and economics literature. The main purpose of this paper is to 
formalize Yamagishi’s idea within a simple game theoretical framework 
and by this to contribute to a better understanding of why trust is 
important for well-functioning market exchanges.  
The model developed also makes it possible to clarify the concept 
of trust. There is a large literature discussing the concept of trust, but it 
seems to be no agreement on the question of what trust really is. Within 
the framework studied in this paper, trust is a willingness to accept 
vulnerability based upon beliefs about the behavior of others. Hence, 
trust is not a behavior (e.g., cooperation) or an action (e.g., taking a risk). 
Trust is an underlying condition that can cause such behavior. Seen in 
this way, trust is essential for good economic performance because it 
helps people to conduct mutual beneficial transactions when contracts 
are incomplete or even missing.  
Finally, the model demonstrates the need to distinguish between 
trust and assurance, a distinction highlighted by Yamagishi (2011) but 
that has not been noticed clearly in past research on trust. Trust is 
important in situations characterized by a high level of social 
uncertainty, in which there are incentives to act untrustworthy and the 
consequences of being the target of untrustworthiness are costly. 
Networks of personalized exchange relationships typically remove the 
incentives to act opportunistically through repeated interaction and 
social control. Hence, people within stable groups or networks generally 
feel safe with insiders. Networks therefore create assurance and not 
trust. Trust becomes important when people step out of networks to deal 
with strangers that are unconstrained by explicit or implicit promises of 
future rewards or punishments.  
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The rest of the article proceeds as follows: In the next section I 
build a simple game theoretic model of trust based on the ideas of 
Yamagishi (2011). The model is then used to analyze the role trust plays 
for the decision to transact in networks or markets. In Section 3 I briefly 
discuss how lack of trust creates problems in situations where the 
opportunity cost of networks are large. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The Model 
2.1 The Costs and Benefits of Networks and Markets 
Consider two players  𝑚𝑚 and 𝑛𝑛 who have the possibility of managing on 
their own or exchange goods and services with each other. The former 
strategy produces the payoff 𝑑𝑑 for both, while the latter strategy gives 
both a payoff of 𝑐𝑐. There are gains from trade, which means that 𝑐𝑐 >  𝑑𝑑.  
Assume now that all trade is governed by incomplete contracts 
which give room for opportunistic behavior. This does not, however, 
create any problems for trade that takes place within networks.  
Following Yamagishi (2011), we assume that networks give full 
assurance against opportunistic behavior. Due to repeated interaction, 
social control and threat of retaliation against opportunism, networks 
allow informal agreements on cooperation to be self-enforcing. 3  We 
model this in the following simple way: If player 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑛𝑛 form a network 
and trade with each other, they receive the payoff 𝑐𝑐 with certainty.  
Due to their small size and restricted exchange possibilities 
networks may, however, restrict the ability to achieve further benefits 
                                                          
3 See e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Taylor (1987), Kandori (1992), and Gibbons 
(2001) for a more formal analysis of how repeated interaction allows informal 
agreements on cooperation to be self-enforcing. 
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related to gains from trade in larger markets. Again following 
Yamagishi (2011), we term this the opportunity cost of network: “[A] 
commitment relationship is a relationship in which one is paying an 
opportunity cost. When one maintains a commitment relationship, one 
foregoes opportunities for getting a better outcome offered by alternative 
partners. That better outcome forgone is the opportunity cost.” 
(Yamagishi, 2011 s 53). This opportunity cost can be taken into account 
by assuming that the players can reap the payoff 𝑏𝑏 by trading outside 
the network, where 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑐𝑐. We call this a market transaction. 
Although a market transaction produces a higher payoff if the 
partner acts trustworthy, a market transaction also produces behavioral 
risk. As players in the market are unknown to one another, their 
interactions are effectively non-repeated, precluding the formation of 
self-enforcing agreements on cooperation that is possible for interactions 
within networks. Yamagishi (2011) refers to another economic concept, 
transaction costs, in order to illustrate the problem this creates: 
“Transaction cost is the time, effort, money etc., that is consumed to 
conduct transactions (...). Losses from being cheated in transactions are 
also included in transaction cost (...).” (Yamagishi, 2011 s 54). The latter 
point is particularly important in Yamagishi’s analysis, and we take it 
into consideration in our model in the following simple way: If a player 
decides to leave a network and jump into a transaction with a stranger 
in the market, the player reaps the payoff 𝑏𝑏  if the stranger is 
trustworthy. If the stranger is untrustworthy the player suffers a loss of 
−𝑒𝑒.  
The balance between costs and benefits will then shape the 
players’ decision to transact in networks or markets. On the one hand, a 
market transaction produces a risk of opportunistic behavior which 
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leads to a loss of −𝑒𝑒 . This risk is removed within a network which 
produces the payoff 𝑐𝑐  with certainty. On the other hand, networks 
restrict the ability to achieve further benefits related to gains from trade 
(the payoff 𝑏𝑏 ). Stated in the words of Yamagishi: “[F]ormation of a 
commitment relationship reduces transaction cost on the one hand, but 
generates opportunity costs on the other hand. Whether or not formation 
of commitment relationships with specific partners is a clever choice 
depends on the relative size of the savings in the transaction cost and the 
opportunity costs incurred.” (Yamagishi, 2011 s 54). However, regardless 
of the size of costs and benefits related to networks and markets, trust 
plays an important independent role for the decision regarding where to 
transact. This can be seen more clearly from Figure 1, which 
summarizes available actions and payoffs in a market transaction.  
To simplify, the market is assumed to be composed of a large 
number of players who act in pairs. Again, we consider the two players 
𝑚𝑚  and 𝑛𝑛 . They are now, however, assumed to be member of their 
respective network 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵. A market transaction where both players 
cooperate (act trustworthy) gives them a payoff of 𝑏𝑏. If both defect (act 
untrustworthy) they get a payoff of 0. If 𝑚𝑚 cooperates and 𝑛𝑛 defects, 𝑚𝑚 
suffers a loss of −𝑒𝑒 while 𝑛𝑛 gets 𝑎𝑎, and vice versa. If 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑐𝑐 > 0 > −𝑒𝑒 
the economic interaction is described by the familiar prisoner’s dilemma.  
When actions taken by each are not subject to complete and 
enforceable contracts, ‘defect’ is the dominant strategy equilibrium for 
this interaction. If all players know this, there will be no market 
transactions. Both players stick to their networks where they get the 
payoff 𝑐𝑐 (with certainty), and the gains from trade will not materialize. 
This observation leads us to the question that forms the core of 
Yamagishi’s analysis: Can the existence of trust make possible market 
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transactions even though contracts are incomplete and there is a potential 
danger of opportunistic behavior?  
 
Figure 1 The payoffs from market transactions 
 
Both everyday observations and results from controlled experiments 
show that many act trustworthy in situations like the one described 
above.4 This is difficult to explain without taking norms into account. 
Let us in the social interaction described above introduce the idea that, 
besides monetary considerations (captured by the payoffs in Figure 1), 
players are motivated by norms. Consider the following reciprocity 
norm: “It is wrong to act untrustworthy against a person who trusts 
you”. Assume also that the norm is fully internalized by those who carry 
it, meaning that the behavior pattern described is followed even when 
violation is impossible to detect and sanction by others.  
Let 𝑧𝑧 >  0  indicate the internalized socio-psychological cost of 
breaking the norm. From the payoff matrix shown in Figure 1 we note 
                                                          
4 See e.g. Bowles and Gintis (2011) and Johnson and Mislin (2011) and references 
cited therein. 
Player n from network B 
Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate 
Defect 
Player m from network A 
b  ,  b 
0  ,  0 a  ,  – e 
– e   ,  a  
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that a player will cooperate when the other player cooperate if 𝑏𝑏 > 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑧𝑧, 
i.e. if  
(1)    𝑧𝑧 > 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 
Let us further allow individuals to be of two types: Those with 𝑧𝑧 = 0 are 
referred to as untrustworthy types and those with 𝑧𝑧 > 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 are referred 
to as trustworthy types. Hence, an untrustworthy type always defects 
while a trustworthy type cooperates if the other player cooperates (the 
trustworthy types have Assurance Game preferences while the 
untrustworthy types have Prisoner’s Dilemma Game preferences). The 
proportion of trustworthy types in network 𝐴𝐴 is denoted 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴, while the 
proportion of trustworthy types in network 𝐵𝐵 is denoted 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵. 
On the anonymous market, the players do not know the type of 
their partner. Assume, however, that players have a belief about the 
proportion of trustworthy types. The proportion of trustworthy types 
determines the probability of not being cheated on the anonymous 
market. The belief about others’ trustworthiness is therefore a measure 
of trust in society. If the players perceive the probability that other 
players act trustworthy (cooperate) as low, they will be more reluctant 
to take the chance of entering the market. This is particularly true if the 
cost of being cheated is high, and/or the payoff from trade in markets is 
low relative to the payoff from trade in networks. If, however, the payoff 
from trade in markets is high relative to the payoff from trade in 
networks, players may be willing to leave their networks even for a low 
level of trust. They are willing to take the chance of being cheated 
because the gain from a mutual trust relationship is so high.  
These examples illustrate that the decision to transact in 
networks or markets is not straightforward, but depends on the 
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interplay between the players’ beliefs about others’ trustworthiness as 
well as the cost and benefits of markets and networks. A more formal 
analysis of the players’ decision problems is therefore needed to derive 
their results and to discuss their implications.   
  
2.2 Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
The social interaction specified above consists of two stages: In the first 
stage, players 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑚𝑚 have to decide whether to stay in their networks 
or enter the market. If they decide to enter the market, they play a game 
with incomplete information about the type of each player, where they 
have to decide whether to cooperate or not. 
We are particularly interested in specifying the conditions for the 
emergence of mutual trust relationships on the market. That is, we 
search for an equilibrium in which players 𝑚𝑚  and 𝑛𝑛  leave their 
networks, and trustworthy types cooperate while untrustworthy types 
defect. This equilibrium expresses a typical situation of trust: Trust is 
important when a person faces a possibility of getting a higher return and 
a risk of being cheated simultaneously. 
By solving the game by backward induction we can specify the 
conditions for the formation of mutual trust relationships. This means 
that we first derive the condition for trustworthy types to act 
trustworthy on the market. Then we derive the condition for both 
trustworthy and untrustworthy types leaving their respective networks, 
given that the trustworthy types act trustworthy. Since the game is 
symmetric, with payoff structures of the same types of players being 
identical, we can look at the decision facing a trustworthy and an 
untrustworthy type from network 𝑖𝑖, where 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵.  
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A trustworthy type cooperates on the market if the expected 
payoff of doing so is larger than the expected payoff of defecting, that is 
if  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)(−𝑒𝑒) > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎 − 𝑧𝑧) + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)0. This inequality is satisfied 
if  
(2)                                    𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧 + 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑒𝑒 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+     
 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ ∈ (0,1)  since 𝑧𝑧 > 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏  from (1). Recall also that an 
untrustworthy type never cooperates.  
The next step is to find the condition for the two types leaving 
their respective networks and entering the market, given that (2) is 
satisfied. Both the trustworthy and the untrustworthy type will enter 
the market if the expected payoff from a market transaction is larger 
than payoff from staying in a network. Hence, a trustworthy type enters 
the market if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)(−𝑒𝑒) > 𝑐𝑐, which is satisfied if 
(3)                                          𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 + 𝑒𝑒 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗    
 
Likewise, an untrustworthy type enters the market if 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 + (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖)0 >
𝑐𝑐, which is satisfied if  
(4)                                             𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖#    
 
It follows from (3) and (4) that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖# , which means that an 
untrustworthy type will take the risk of entering the market for a lower 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 than a trustworthy type. This can be seen by a simple examination of 
the expected payoff from a market transaction for the two types. Since 
an untrustworthy type never cooperates on the market, he gets a higher 
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payoff no matter what type he meets compared to a trustworthy type. 
Hence, if the proportion of trustworthy types is large enough for the 
trustworthy types to enter the market, the untrustworthy types will do 
the same. 
 
2.3 Trust as a Booster 
By combining inequalities (2) - (4) we find the condition for mutual trust 
relationships to be formed on the market. We have already stated that 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖#. It then follows that the three inequalities given in (2) - (4) all 
are satisfied if  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗ > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+. The condition for mutual trust relationships to 
be formed on the market is thus 
(5)                                           𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑒𝑒𝑏𝑏 + 𝑒𝑒 ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗    
 
which is the same as the inequality given in (3). (5)  says that 
trustworthy types take the risk of leaving their networks only if they 
perceive the probability that the (unknown) counterpart behaves 
trustworthy as large enough (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 > 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖∗). Hence, (5) is a formalization of 
Yamagishi’s idea that in situations; “(…) in which both social 
uncertainty and opportunity costs of maintaining commitment 
relationships are large, general trust (...), plays the role of a ‘booster 
rocket’ providing necessary ‘thrust’ from the ‘takeoff’ from commitment 
relationship.” (Yamagishi, 2011 s 55).   
How much trust is needed in order to establish mutual trust 
relationships? As can be seen from (5) this depends on the ratio between 
the payoffs produced in networks and markets (𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑒𝑒), since these 
payoffs determine the size of the critical value 𝑝𝑝∗.  𝑒𝑒 is the cost of being 
cheated on the market. It follows from (5) that an increase in 𝑒𝑒 drives 
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up 𝑝𝑝∗, making it harder to form mutual trust relationships, unless the 
players are more trusting. Put differently: If the cost of being cheated is 
high, players will be reluctant to run the risk of being cheated unless 
they are very sure that other players are trustworthy. 
 (5)  also illustrates that the payoffs 𝑏𝑏  and 𝑐𝑐  affect the critical 
value of 𝑝𝑝∗  in a natural way. 𝑏𝑏  is the payoff from a mutual trust 
relationship on the market, while 𝑐𝑐  is the payoff from staying in a 
network (where 𝑏𝑏 >  𝑐𝑐). Remember that 𝑐𝑐 is received for sure within a 
network, while 𝑏𝑏  is received with probability 𝑝𝑝  outside the network. 
That is, the payoff 𝑏𝑏 comes with a risk of being cheated. The larger 𝑐𝑐 is, 
the higher 𝑝𝑝∗  must be, and the more trust must be present for the 
trustworthy types to take the risk of entering the market. Increasing the 
payoff from a mutual trust relationship (𝑏𝑏) has the opposite effect. An 
increase in 𝑏𝑏 lowers the threshold 𝑝𝑝∗, making it easier to form a mutual 
trust relationship at lower levels of trust. The greater the value of 
mutual trust, the greater risks the players will be willing to take in an 
effort to achieve it.  
The relationship between 𝑏𝑏 , 𝑐𝑐  and 𝑒𝑒  can be interpreted as the 
relationship between transaction costs and opportunity costs, using  the 
terminology of Yamagishi (2011). 𝑏𝑏 is the opportunity cost of networks, 
defined as the forgone opportunities for getting a better outcome outside 
the network. The higher this opportunity cost is (for a given 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑒𝑒), the 
more networks appear as a constraint rather than an asset. On the other 
hand, a player can save transaction costs by staying in a current network 
in which untrustworthy behavior is precluded. Hence, the higher 𝑐𝑐 and 
𝑒𝑒 are (for a given 𝑏𝑏), the more networks appear as an asset rather than 
a  constraint. In sum, whether or not it pays to stay in current networks 
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depends on the relationship between transaction costs and opportunity 
costs.  
 
3. When Trust is Missing 
It follows from the above analysis that if the level of trust is low and 
people feel the need to safeguard their interests in established networks, 
it will be harder to profit from trade in larger markets. Again, note that 
𝑏𝑏  is the opportunity cost of networks, defined as the forgone 
opportunities for getting a better outcome outside the network. A main 
point stressed by Yamagishi (2011) is that this opportunity cost of 
networks is now steadily increasing due to a more integrated world 
economy and larger markets. In this situation general trust is the key 
for a successful reorganization of society, a reorganization which implies 
less networks and more open trade where new opportunities and 
relationships play a more prominent role.  
In order to illustrate this observation, Yamagishi (2011) offers an 
interesting discussion of the recent history of economic development in 
Japan. From being an economic “success-story”, Japan today is marked 
by a lack of innovation and poor economic performance. Yamagishi 
argues that this is partly due to the rigid and dysfunctional social, 
political and economic networks that dominate the Japanese society. 
While many have interpreted these networks as productivity enhancing 
and a sign of widespread trust, Yamagishi draws the opposite 
conclusion. He considers the extensive networks in the Japanese society 
as a sign of lack of trust and as an important obstacle to economic change 
and development. He states that: “[I]n future Japanese society, the 
traditional practice of closing off relationships to the outside and 
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building internal cooperation will damage rather than enhance 
economic, political and social efficiency. (...) Japanese society needs to 
abandon the collectivist behavioral pattern centered around the security 
of stable relationships, and distrust in and discrimination towards 
outsiders.” (Yamagishi, 2011 p. 3-5).  
 The reason why many seem to think about Japan as a trust-
society is, according to Yamagishi (2011), that people do not distinguish 
between the concepts of ‘trust’ and ‘assurance’.  Networks typically 
remove the incentives to act opportunistically through repeated 
interaction, social control and easy access to information about the 
network members’ past behavior. Networks therefore create assurance 
and not trust. Trust is important in situations characterized by social 
uncertainty, that is in situations where you do not know whether your 
trading partner is trustworthy or not. This is typically the situation on 
the more anonymous market. Hence, trust becomes important when 
actors consider moving out of established networks to deal with 
strangers that offer new opportunities and more profitable projects, but 
where these strangers are unconstrained by explicit or implicit promises 
of future rewards or punishments.  
This idea can be illustrated more formally with the help of Figure 
2 and the model developed above. The grey area in Figure 2 shows the 
range of 𝑝𝑝 that makes possible mutual trust relationships, for a given 
value of 𝑐𝑐 , 𝑒𝑒  and 𝑏𝑏   (this follows from the condition given by (5) ). 
Assume, however, that the players have a belief about 𝑝𝑝 that is lower 
than 𝑝𝑝∗, meaning that they will not take the risk of entering the market 
– they will stay in their current networks. Given their beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness, the players consider the payoff from a market 
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transaction ( 𝑏𝑏 ) as too low relative to the payoff from a network 
transaction (𝑐𝑐) and the cost of being cheated on the market (𝑒𝑒). 
 
Figure 2 The range of 𝑝𝑝 that produces mutual trust relationships 
 
If 𝑏𝑏 increases, making trade on the market more attractive relative to 
network trade, 𝑝𝑝∗ moves to the left. Players may then be willing to enter 
the market and establish trust relationships depending on their belief 
about others’ trustworthiness.  
If the players have an initial belief about 𝑝𝑝 that is in the shaded 
area, they will move out of their current networks when 𝑏𝑏 increases. If, 
however, the players have a belief about 𝑝𝑝 that is outside the shaded 
area, for instance ?̂?𝑝, they will stay in their current networks despite the 
increase in 𝑏𝑏. Hence, both the individual and society will not be able to 
reap the increased gains produced in markets due to lack of trust. 
The main message following from this is that the societies that 
will be most successful in profiting from rapidly increasing benefits 
associated with free and open trade are those that possess a high degree 
of general trust. The Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑒𝑒
𝑏𝑏 + 𝑒𝑒 0 1 𝑝𝑝 
An increase in 𝑏𝑏 lowers the threshold 𝑝𝑝∗:  
1 0 
𝑝𝑝 
𝑝𝑝∗ ?̂?𝑝 
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Sweden) may serve as interesting cases. Algan and Cahuc (2013) have 
collected data for average levels of generalized trust for 111 countries, 
generated from responses to various surveys.5 These surveys ask the 
familiar question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people”? 
The trust variable is given the value 1 if the respondent answers that 
“Most people can be trusted” and 0 if the respondent thinks that one 
“Need to be careful”. Trust levels vary substantially between countries, 
with Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland as the top four in the 
ranking. In Norway, 68.1 percent of the population trusts others. At the 
opposite end of the ranking lies Trinidad and Tobago, with an average 
trust level of only 3.8 percent. In Japan, 41.6 of the population exhibits 
interpersonal trust. The Nordic countries are clearly high-trust 
societies. At the same time the Nordic countries are among the richest 
countries in the world. 
Seen in the light of the model developed above, the good economic 
performance of the Nordic countries may be partly due to their high trust 
levels and their ability to exploit the gains both from networks and 
markets. The Nordic countries are well known for embracing free trade 
and openness (except for agricultural products). Measured by import 
and export relative to GDP, the Nordic countries are among the most 
open economies in the world (Barth and Moene, 2013). This may be seen 
as an indication that these countries have managed to secure a good 
combination of networks and markets, producing good economic 
performance. Admittedly, this observation has a distinctly speculative 
flavor. On the other hand, it is not “merely” a speculation, but a 
speculation guided by structured economic reasoning. In addition, my 
                                                          
5 The World Values, the European Values Survey, and the Afrobarometer. 
18 
 
speculation points to a link between trust and economic performance 
that has been little investigated, but which deserves more attention in 
future work.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper has been to formalize Yamagishi’s 
(2011) concept of trust and the role trust plays for social organization 
and economic performance.  
Incomplete contracts expose people to social uncertainty and 
behavioral risk. A common strategy to deal with this is to restrict 
economic transactions to take place in networks. Networks allow 
informal agreements of cooperation to be self-enforcing through 
repeated interaction and threat of retaliation against opportunism. 
Hence, networks may be regarded as a mechanism for the reduction of 
behavioral risk. At the same time, networks generate an important 
opportunity cost. Due to their small size and exclusionary practices, 
networks restrict the opportunities to benefit from gains from trade in 
larger markets.  
When the gains from market transactions are large, maintaining 
networks is not necessarily advantageous even though they reduce 
behavioral risk. When market transactions produce behavioral risk and 
the opportunity cost of networks are large, trust becomes important. 
Trust acts as a “booster rocket”, which makes it possible for people to 
break out of established commitments and invest their resources in more 
uncertain but also more profitable projects.  
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